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Introduction
The electricity industry is undergoing fundamental changes leading to a more liberal regime and the alteration of its business logic. As part of the process, vertically integrated utilities and simple transfer pricing rules are substituted by sophisticated …nancial trading arrangements. De-regulated electricity markets feature imperfect competition, very low demand elasticity, discontinuously convex supply functions, high-frequency repeated trading, several production tecnologies and high potential for collusion (Wilson, 2002) . As a result, prices in the new electricity hubs are volatile and often characterised by strategic behaviour and learning, which poses new challenges both for the operations and scholarly study of the industry.
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y Both authors are with Universitat Pompeu Fabra and the Barcelona GSE. Albert Banal-Estañol is also with City University, albert.banalestanol@upf.edu, augusto.ruperezmicola@upf.edu interacting, boundedly-rational agents (see Marks, 2006; Weidlich and Veit, 2008 for surveys). 1 The literature includes models commissioned by large …rms (e.g. Gaz de France, E.ON, Shell) and the UK's Competition Commission as well as some calibrations of the US market, like the "Electricity Market Complex Adaptive System" (EMCAS) (Macal and North, 2005) and the "Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems" (AMES) (Sun and Tesfatsion, 2007) .
One of the advantages of behavioural simulations is that they are tailored to …t closely the operations in each industry. However, this is a disadvantage when it comes to understanding the factors driving the results because there is no consensus on the techniques appropriate for each situation. As a consequence, simulation results are often not comparable (Fagiolo et al., 2007) and these methods are struggling to reach their full potential (e.g. Leombruni et al., 2006) . First, some papers assume that …rms behave according to the reinforcement model while other papers use more complex forms of behaviour like …ctitious play or best response. Second, few papers specify the initial conditions. Third, demand is assumed to be elastic in some cases and inelastic in others. Finally, several papers use stepwise schedules to model the supply part of the market, while in others sellers bid linearly increasing functions. This paper explores the consistency of the behavioural simulation techniques used in the literature to model the operations of the new wholesale electricity auctions. We investigate the e¤ects of the assumptions on simulation outcomes and how these outcomes compare to simple, empirically-supported, theoretical predictions. Speci…cally, we cast light on whether the results are consistent with the standard claim that pivotal dynamics determine the relationship between competition and prices. A …rm is pivotal if the quantity demanded exceeds the sum of production capacities of all other …rms and, as a result, it is necessary to ful…ll demand. There is wide consensus on the importance of pivotal dynamics in spot electricity markets. In our setting, all …rms are pivotal when there are few of them but none of them is pivotal if there are many of them. As a consequence, our theoretical results predict that prices will be high under monopoly, will decrease with competition, drastically change at a pivotal dynamics "switching point", and will approach marginal costs beyond that point.
We adopt a stylised setting that allows us to include alternative implementations of demand, supply and …rm behaviour, which yield many of the literature's models as particular cases. Demand can be inelastic or price-sensitive, with a wide range of levels and elasticity speci…cations. Firms are allowed to submit either ‡at bids or increasing supply schedules, with single or multiple bids per plant. Firms' behaviour is governed by Camerer and Ho's (1999) Experience-Weighted Attraction algorithm (EWA) which includes reinforcement learning, …ctitious play and best-response as particular cases and allows for the speci…cation of di¤erent initial conditions. Simulation outcomes are consistent with our theoretical predictions under ‡at and supply function bidding, and under several plausible elasticities. However, the performance of the simulations is in ‡uenced by the number of bids per plant and the initial conditions. The performance of …ctitious play is poor, and it is clearly outperformed by best-response and especially reinforcement learning. The results call into question a large part of the extant behavioural electricity research and can potentially enhance the practical implementation of these techniques in the operation of the energy industry. We also …nd some evidence suggesting that experimental research can help us identify the most suitable assumptions in market simulations. Weighted …ctitious play, and especially power choice rules and regret-feedback models improve over some of the standard models. This paper is part of a new literature examining the consistency of behavioural simulations in various de-regulated market settings (e.g. Fagiolo et al., 2007; Leombruni et al., 2007; Marks, 2007; and Midgley et al., 2007) . In the electricity industry, we are only aware of two related working papers. bidding in a stylised setting. The question of validation, that is which models best …t real market data, is complementary to ours. Our approach mainly focuses on theoretical reliability, and includes comparisons of demand, supply, and behavioural speci…cations.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In part 2 we discuss the literature. In part 3, we present our framework and the alternative implementations of demand, supply and …rm behaviour.
In part 4 we derive the theoretical prediction. Part 5 includes the simulation results and we conclude in part 6. All proofs are in the supplementary material.
Behavioural electricity modelling alternatives
The three main sets of assumptions in behavioural electricity simulations are the representation of supply, demand, behavioural rules. This section is a survey of the choices made in existing work. In Table 1 we classify some of the most relevant papers.
Supply bidding
Bertrand and Bertrand with capacity constraints are generally not considered suitable in the electricity literature because they do not …t the uniform pricing prevalent in power pools. Cournot quantity bidding is sometimes used as an alternative (e.g. Veit et al., 2006) .
However, a recurrent argument is that Cournot is also unsuitable because in real pools generators are allowed to submit multiple ‡at bids for sections of their capacity. Hence, most papers use either von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) stepwise auctions, or Green and Newbery's (1992) adaptation of the "supply function" (SF) equilibrium due to Klemperer and Meyer (1989) .
In the stepwise approach, the market is a sealed-bid, multiple-unit auction. Generators simultaneously submit single prices at which they are willing to supply sections of their capacity. An independent auctioneer ranks the bids according to their o¤er prices, intersects the demand and supply and determines the system marginal price.
The stepwise literature includes both per plant and overall …rm bidding models. Stepwise auction papers with one bid per generator are more parsimonious and comparable to the theoretical literature. Nicolaisen et. al. (2001) and Richter and Sheblé (1998) create models similar to those of auction theory to study the structure and e¢ ciency of electricity markets. Closer to industrial organisation, Inherent in ‡exibilities in the operation of nuclear assets (e.g. safety concerns, very low marginal costs and high start-up and loss of volume costs) prompt generators to submit ‡at schedules at very low prices for each plant. However, the assumption is quite restrictive in comparison to most bid-based electricity markets where they can submit many bid steps per plant. Multi-bidding leads to the wellknown "hockey stick" shape of the supply curve, with base-load plants submitting ‡at schedules and peak-load generators o¤ering steeper step functions. Accordingly, a number of simulations include several bids per plant. For example, Day and Bunn (2001) and Bunn and Day (2009) developed detailed models of the England and Wales pool between 1990 and 2001. Oliveira (2001, 2003 ) look into the related e¤ect of NETA's introduction and test whether the incumbents could in ‡uence prices. However, these models are often computationally cumbersome fo two reasons. First, the algorithm's operations grow with the number of bids. Second, …rms'coordination is more di¢ cult, which complicates learning and the convergence to a steady state.
The SF approach approximates actual bids with increasing supply functions relating quantities and prices. This is a compromise between providing realism and simplifying the simulation mechanics.
Banal-Estanol and Rupérez Micola (2009) include an SF model with two stepwise bids per …rm. Cincotti et al (2005) study the e¤ect of market microstructure and costs on prices, and Visudhiphan and Ilic (1999) focus on dynamic learning. Bunn (2001, 2009 ) propose an even more ‡exible approach in which …rms submit several SF sections per plant.
However, the presence of multiple equilibria complicates the comparison of simulation and equilibrium results. For example, the SF model has little predictive value if variation in demand is small because almost anything between the Cournot and the competitive solution can be supported in equilibrium (see Bolle 1992) . Further, the solution is unde…ned if there is no short-run demand elasticity (von der Fehr and Harbord, 1998). Similarly, there are often many non-Pareto ranked equilibria in stepwise auction settings (e.g. von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993; Crawford et al., 2006 ). 
Demand representation

Behavioural algorithm
Behavioural simulation models require rules to govern …rm behaviour. One of their main intentions is to realistically represent human decision-making, and its proponents frequently argue that existing deductive mechanisms often do poorly in experiments (Camerer and Ho, 1999, Roth and Erev, 1995; and van Huyck et al., 1990 , are regularly used to support this claim). The electricity behavioural simulations literature is based on adaptive learning algorithms mainly derived from psychology. Some previous work uses reinforcement learning (RL). In RL, …rms tend to repeat actions that led to positive outcomes and avoid those that were detrimental. Several papers have used modi…ed versions of the Roth and Erev (1995) Sun and Tesfatsion (2007) and Veit et al. (2006) . It is based on the law of e¤ect, whereby actions that result in more positive consequences are more likely to be repeated in the future, and on the law of practice, whereby learning curves tend to be steep initially and then ‡atten out. These are robust properties observed in the literature on human learning. One of RL's main strengths is that one does not need to make assumptions on the information that players have about each other's strategies, history of play and the payo¤ structure. This is consistent with the fact that, in many cases, electricity traders cannot observe one another's current strategies, and only imperfectly infer them from volatile prices. However, RL might be too simplistic to fully capture the strategic opportunities available to humans Ert and Erev, 2007) .
It is likely that players in reality engage in more sophisticated behaviour like best response to their competitors'actions. There are two main types of best response algorithms: …ctitious play (FP) and "Cournot" best response (BR). 2 In FP (Brown, 1951) , each player assumes that her opponents play stationary, possibly mixed, strategies. In each round, the player best responds to her opponent's empirical frequency of play. Electricity studies using FP include those by Oliveira (2001, 2003) and García et al. (2005) . BR implies that the player only responds to her opponents' move in the directly precedent period. BR papers include those by Oliveira (2007, 2008) and Day and Bunn (2001) and Bunn and Day (2009) . 3 To our knowledge, there is no research on whether the results obtained with RL, FP and BR di¤er substantially in the electricity context. The use of weighted …ctitious play, power choice rules and regret models may improve the models'quality.
Finally, most papers do not report initial conditions. In those that do, the standard approach is to use a uniform initial probability distribution for all elements of the action space (e.g. Rupérez Micola 3 Modelling speci…cations Our model incorporates key features of electricity markets in the short-run. Although it could be easily extended to become more complex, it is stylised to facilitate the exposition as well as the comparison between theoretical predictions and simulation results. We …rst present the market structure and trading rules that form our framework. Then, we describe the alternative parameter implementations of demand, supply and …rm behaviour, which yield many of the literature's models as particular cases.
Market structure and trading rules
Let there be n symmetric generators, i = 1; :::; n, with constant marginal production costs, c, up to capacity. Denoting the market capacity as K, the individual capacity of each …rm is k n = K=n. For a given K, n parametrises the degree of competition in the market, as the individual capacities decrease with the number of generators.
Prices are bounded between marginal costs and , with being the maximum "reasonable"price cap (e.g. Lin et al., 2009). This can be understood as a limit triggering regulatory intervention or the cost of alternative, expensive load fuels to which the system administrator could switch at short notice. It also re ‡ects high cost back-up power generation facilities owned by many industrial users.
Although relevant in the long term, we do not deal with capacity expansion, long-term contracts, ancillary and capacity payments. For ease of comparison to existing research, we have also left out the network issues inherent in the operations of electricity utilities, i.e. we assume an un-congested network as is done in most of the existing simulations'literature.
Trading takes place through a compulsory, uniform-price auction. Suppliers simultaneously submit individual schedules. An independent auctioneer adds them horizontally and creates an ad hoc market supply function. Then she intersects it with the market demand and determines the uniform price b p.
Finally, she assigns individual quantities, q i ; to each of the bidders. Pro…ts for each …rm are i = (b p c) q i for i = 1; :::; n:
Demand representations
We accommodate di¤erent demand levels and elasticities. Demand, Q(p), can be inelastic or pricesensitive. In the inelastic case, demand is equal to a constant quantity Q for any price between zero and , i.e. a vertical line at Q, Q(p) Q. We rotate this curve to obtain linear functions with di¤erent elasticities at the same point. We denote the vertical coordinate of the rotation point as v (0 v ) and the deviation to the left of Q at the price cap level as u (0 u Q). Thus, all demand curves are linear, pass through ( Q; v) and ( Q u; ) and can be written as
In all cases, market demand is assumed to lead to system overcapacity, i.e. Q(p) < K for all p. 
Supply representations
Supply schedules vary along two dimensions. First, …rms are allowed to submit either ‡at bids ("stepwise bidding" case) or increasing supply schedules ("SF bidding" case). Second, in line with Day and Bunn, 2001, and Hobbs and Pang, 2007, we consider multi-step schedules. We divide each …rm's capacity into m equally-sized capacity bins, k n =m. We use alternative values of m in the stepwise and supply bidding cases. We now provide details for each case and explain the market clearing process.
Stepwise bidding The feasible price o¤er domain is approximated by a discrete grid. Generators choose from S possible bids, equally spaced between c and , at which they are willing to supply each bin's capacity. That is, the set of possible bids is 
Firm behaviour representations
We use the Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) adaptive learning mechanism (Camerer and Ho, 1999 ). This behavioural model nests RL, FP and BR as special cases. It assumes that each feasible action of each bin has a numerical attraction. The attractions generate a bin-speci…c probability distribution. In each round, generators submit supply schedules according to these bin-speci…c probability distributions. Once the market clears, the attractions are adjusted with the behavioural rule and mapped into new probability distributions. This process is repeated until the simulation converges.
We now describe how …rms use experience to update the attractions, and how these lead to choice probabilities. Then we specify the initial attractions and the convergence de…nition.
Updating rules and choice probabilities Each action s for bin j in generator i has an "attraction"
A j i;s (t) > 0 after period t ( 1). Attractions are updated according to
where r j i and r j i denote the action taken in period t by bin j of …rm i and by the rest of the bins, respectively; I(x; y) is an indicator function with value 1 if x = y and 0 if x 6 = y; N (t) = N (t 1) + 1
with N (0) = 0, representing the number of "observation-equivalents" of past experience; and the EWA parameters , , and denote the weight placed on foregone payo¤s, a discount factor to depreciate previous attractions, and a discount factor that weights the impact of previous against future experience, respectively. When = 0 and = 0, EWA behaves like the widely used class of RL models (e.g. Roth-Erev, 1995) . RL models are based on the law of e¤ect, whereby actions that result in more positive consequences are more likely to be repeated in the future, and on the law of practice, whereby learning curves tend to be steep initially and then ‡atten out. When = 1, and = , EWA is equivalent to the standard weighted belief-based models. In particular, it produces BR when = = 0 and FP when = = 1. In BR dynamics, players actions are determined by the best response to what her opponents did in the immediately preceding period, so that only the most recent observation counts. In FP, each player best responds to the empirical frequency of play of her opponents since the beginning of the game, and all observations count equally. As is done is most of the electricity literature, we linearly map attractions into action choice probabilities. The probability of selecting an action in the next period is its attraction divided by the sum of attractions for all actions,
Note that this is a particular case of the power probability function used by Camerer and Ho (1999) in which the exponent is equal to one. In the same paper, Camerer and Ho (1999) also propose a power function, which we employ in the last section of our analysis.
Prior beliefs and initial conditions The probabilities in the …rst period, P j i;s (1), are generated from prior values of the attractions, A j i;s (0). As explained by Camerer and Ho (1999) , the prior values of the attractions may re ‡ect pre-game experience. We construct A j i;s (0) from four representative assumptions on prior beliefs. We assume that …rms believe that the others will initially (i) choose the To our knowledge, the literature only includes uniform initial probability distributions over all the elements of the action space, which implicitely implies that …rms believe that their opponents will bid . Thus, take the case of twelve …rms. In treatment (i), that is when …rms believe that their opponents will initially bid , they think that any bid below would allow them to sell full capacity at . Hence all the actions below S have initial attractions equal to the maximum pro…ts, i.e. A j i;s (0) = k n for all s < S, and the same initial probability, P j i;s (1) 1 S 1 . In treatment (ii), when …rms believe that others will initially bid the minimum price (s = 1), any bid above the minimum would be out-of-the-money and earn them zero pro…ts. Therefore, the initial attractions are concentrated on s = 1 and therefore P j i;1 (1) = 1 and P j i;s (1) = 0 for s > 1. In treatment (iii), when …rms assume the others will initially bid in the middle of the distribution, they randomise over their lower half and assign zero probability in the upper half. Finally, in treatment (iv), when players assume that the others will initially follow a uniform distribution, they bid more competitively than if they used a uniform distribution, assigning higher probability to lower prices.
Convergence We de…ne convergence in terms of strategy pro…les (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998 , for a literature overview). A simulation run has converged if the maximum per-period change in the probability of playing any strategy is below a (small) threshold.
De…nition 1 For a given (small), a simulation run has converged to a mixed strategy pro…le z in period t if for any potential action pro…le a in period t + 1, the probability distribution adjustment of any action s of any bin j of any generator i is such that P j i;s (t + 1) P j i;s (t) < :
The simulation price is computed from the …rms' mixed strategy pro…le z.
In practice, we select the action with the lowest probability in period t. Then, we compute the hypothetical probability that would result from assigning maximum pro…ts to this action and minimum pro…ts to all the other actions. The simulation has not converged as long as the di¤erence between present and future probabilities is higher than . It has converged when it is lower. The smaller , the more stringent the threshold and the higher the necessary t.
Once there is convergence, we calculate expected end-of-simulation prices from the individual probability distributions. Note that convergence is compatible with the survival of several feasible trading actions, as in mixed strategies. Price volatility may not be equal to zero even if there is a steady state. Moreover, EWA bidding depends on the stochastic process and, as a result, simulation runs for the same parameters might lead to di¤erent end prices, i.e. the standard deviation of mean prices across simulations is not necessarily zero.
Theoretical predictions
We now derive predictions on the e¤ect of competition on market prices. The predicted market prices shall depend on the number of "pivotal" plants (see e.g. Genc and Reynolds, 2005; Entriken and Wan, 2005; Banal-Estanol and Ruperez Micola, 2009). A …rm is pivotal if it is necessary to satisfy the quantity in demand. In the inelastic case, the de…nition is straightforward as the demand is constant, but in the elastic case, the quantity demanded depends on the supply bids. In general, one has to de…ne pivotality for an exogenous demand level.
De…nition 2 A …rm i is pivotal for a given level of demand Q 0 if this level exceeds the sum of production capacities of all other …rms, i.e. if j6 =i k n = (n 1)k n < Q 0 .
Pivotal dynamics are simple in symmetric settings. In markets with few …rms, they are all pivotal.
In those featuring many …rms, none is pivotal. We next de…ne the level of competition at which the number of pivotal …rms changes. (c) If the number of …rms is higher than this threshold (n n u ), then all …rms bidding c is an equilibrium. The equilibrium price is c:
The equilibrium price drops from the monopoly price of the residual demand to competitive levels atn u . It is unique if n = 1 <n u (monopoly) and if n >n u (marginal cost pricing). If 1 < n <n u , however, there are multiple pure strategy equilibria with many payo¤-equivalent actions as part of each of them. 5 Note that this prediction is not speci…c to any of the supply, demand, and behavioural assumptions that we explore in this paper. Further, there is wide consensus on the importance of pivotal dynamics in real electricity markets (for a discussion on the role of pivotal dynamics, see e.g. Rothkopf, 2002) .
The prediction is so standard that any combination of modelling assumptions aiming to reproduce spot electricity markets should be able to ful…ll it.
Simulations
We …rst introduce the simulation parameters. and graphically compare the simulation outcomes with the theory. Then, we formally test whether the data for each speci…cation features breaking points at 5 There are also many mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
the predicted locations and, whether the predicted switching point is best-…tting.
Parameters
We allow the number of …rms, which parametrises the degree of competition, to vary from one to twelve, 1 n 12. Marginal costs are set to zero, c = 0. Total capacity is K = 10, so individual capacities decrease from k 1 = 10 to k 12 = 0:833. The price ceiling is = 20, with a grid of S = 50 possible actions and a demand rotation point v = 10. The convergence parameter is = 0:004: We focus on the demand, supply and behaviour assumptions in turn. We use as a reference speci…cation an inelastic demand with 20% excess capacity (u = 0 and Q = 8), …rms using stepwise bidding with one bin (m = 1), and …rms learning following RL with a uniform initial distribution.
To study the e¤ect of the demand assumptions, we …x the reference supply (stepwise bidding and m = 1) and behavioural representations (RL and uniform initial distribution). We run simulations for the combinations of expected demand levels Q = f8; 8:5; 9g and elasticity parameters u = f0; 0:5; 1g:
We perform 50 simulations for each n and for each combination of demand level and elasticity parameters. The data set includes 3 3 12 50 = 5; 400 observations.
When we focus on the supply side, we …x the demand ( Q = 8 and u = 0) and behavioural speci…cations (RL and uniform initial distribution). We perform simulations for each, the stepwise and supply function bidding, and for one, two and three bins. The resulting data includes 2 3 12 50 = 3; 600 observations.
For the behavioural analysis, we …x the supply and demand speci…cations (stepwise, m = 1, Q = 8
and u = 0). We perform simulations for each, BR, RL and FP, and for prior beliefs equal to , 0, Demand speci…cations Figure 1 reports the demand results. Simulations use as demand levels Q = 8; 8:5 or 9 (in columns one, two and three, respectively) and, as elasticity assumptions, u = 0; 0:5, or 1 (in rows one, two and three). In all the panels, the supply and behavioural assumptions are one-bin stepwise bidding and RL with uniform initial distribution.
Simulation results
Monopoly prices are close to (= 20) and the relationship between n and p is decreasing. In the inelastic cases (u = 0, …rst row), p drops rapidly in n but ‡attens out around n = 5; n = 6 and n = 10, respectively for Q = f8; 8:5; 9g. More competition has a small e¤ect beyond those values, but p remains clearly above c, particularly in the case of tight capacity ( Q = 9, third column).
In the elastic cases (second and third rows), the theory predicted a break at the upper switching points: b n u = f7; 10; 12g for u = 0:5 and b n u = f10; 12; 12g for u = 1 for Q = f8; 8:5; 9g, respectively.
That is, as elasticity increases, we predict a break for higher levels of n. Instead, the simulations show a lower breaking point as the elasticity increases, particularly under tight capacity. As we will see, this is consistent with a break at the lower switching point.
Comparing simulation results across speci…cations, the impact of the elasticity seems to be, at best, modest. Simulations are similar across rows, in terms of both price levels and the shape of the n to p relationship. However, under tight capacity, a higher elasticity seems to make the price more sensitive to n. Across demand levels, p tends to be less sensitive to n as the levels of demand increase.
Higher demand levels also lead to higher overall prices. This is also consistent with Proposition 5, which predicts that equilibrium prices are increasing in Q (higher b n u and higher p m ).
Overall, the demand results are quite, but not perfectly, consistent with the theory. First, although monopoly prices are close to and the relationship between n and p is decreasing, post-threshold prices are far from c. Second, inelastic simulations …t the break predictions better than those with elasticity.
Third, smaller excess capacity (K Q) results in higher prices. Fourth, results do not vary too much within our elasticity ranges, which are comparable to those in the literature. Figure 2 reports the bidding assumption results. Simulations use stepwise (…rst row) or SF bidding (second row) with one, two or three bins (columns one, two and three). We use Q = 8 and u = 0 and RL with uniform initial distribution in all cases.
Supply speci…cations
As predicted, the relationship between n and p monotonously decreases both for the stepwise and the SF assumptions. Its shape changes around n = 5, consistent with the prediction of a switching point at b n u = 5. In the stepwise case, however, prices remain above the competitive levels after the threshold. p's sensitivity to n decreases with the number of bins and therefore the deviation from Although the price variability increases, SF yields a better …t in terms of average prices. This is probably because its higher "expressiveness"overcomes the di¢ culties to coordinate in the theoretical prediction. The standard deviation grows in m, especially around the switching point. Under SF, bids above the equilibrium price may be reinforced because they also obtain substantial pro…ts. It is therefore more di¢ cult for …rms to tell good from bad bids and dispersion grows. In comparison, stepwise bids are either on-or out-of-the-money. Hence it is easier to identify the good bids and the simulations become crisper. Overall, prices are less sensitive to n under stepwise bidding and SF is better at capturing the extreme monopoly and competitive predictions. Still, SF's price dispersions increase substantially around the pivotal breaks. The di¤erences between RL and BR can be traced back to the algorithms' features. Under BR, prices have been shown to be competitive when no …rm is pivotal. This is because under BR, the attractions of all the actions above those used by the other …rms in the previous period are reduced to zero. Therefore …rms choose lower actions and p can only stay constant or decrease. The resulting unravelling yields p = c. When all …rms are pivotal, equilibrium forces tend to increase p so that …rms choose high actions with some probability. Simultaneously, unravelling prevents p from staying very high. On balance, p never reaches , not even in monopoly, and may even increase slightly. In RL, instead, there are no in-built unravelling and best-response mechanisms. Actions above those of the opponents are still played because they might have generated pro…ts in earlier periods. Thus, p is higher than under BR for all n.
Behavioural speci…cations
Fictitious play (third row) departs signi…cantly from the predictions. Monopoly prices are around 14, are slightly increasing in n and stay patently above competitive levels. FP keeps most of the initial noise as it weights heavily initial periods with quasi-random outcomes. Firms assign propensities to inadequate actions, adaptation slows down and there is strong path dependence. There are two countervailing forces at work. On the one hand, the higher n the more likely it is that there will be unravelling as in the case of best response. On the other hand, initial random prices are more likely to be high if there are more …rms, so that reductions start from a higher base. Monopoly prices are far from because of unravelling. Prices when no …rm is pivotal are far from zero owing to high initial prices. They are not decreasing due to the in-built best-response features of the algorithm. On balance, the n to p relationship is quite ‡at and stays far from the theory extremes.
Overall, RL best matches the theory but is not as reactive to market conditions as BR. FP performs worst. Competitive prior beliefs render by far the most homogeneous post-switching prices across behavioural assumptions. This is because beliefs are self-ful…lling. Everyone's best response is to bid c when they believe that the others will bid c. BR and FP lock themselves up in that value while experimentation in RL is not powerful enough to depart from it. The theoretical soundness of RL with competitive initial beliefs is strikingly good and the best of the twelve. Monopoly prices are only slightly below , and decrease clearly in n for n < 5, so that prices are above 10. For n > 5, prices converge to c. These results are to our knowledge the …rst on the robustness of simulation techniques to behavioural choices in electricity markets.
Threshold regressions
In this section, we carry out tests of whether the simulation data con…rm our hyptheses. We estimate a piecewise linear model between n and p for each demand, supply and behavioural combination. The models are uniquely speci…ed by a dummy variable associated with the upper switching point b n u ;
The pre-and post-breaking points regression estimates are speci…ed by E(p i jD i = 0; n i ) = 0 + 2 n i and E(p i jD i = 1; n i ) = ( 0 + 1 ) + ( 2 + 3 )n i :
We test …rst the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of structural breaks at the pivotal switching points b n u . Evidence supporting the existence of a breaking point can come either from signi…cant intercept or slope change coe¢ cients, i.e. 1 and 3 di¤erent from zero. Second, we test whether prices are decreasing in the number of …rms before the breaking point and ‡atter thereafter, i.e. 2 negative and 3 positive. Table 2 reports the results on the demand, supply and behavioural assumptions. On the left-hand side of each block, we specify the parameters used in each speci…cation, together with the implied upper switching point. The parameters changing in each block are in boxes. The right-hand side reports regression estimates. The coe¢ cients correspond to equation (5) .
In all cases, either 1 or 3 (or both) is signi…cant at standard levels. There are three non-signi…cant coe¢ cients (one 1 , two 3 ) but the other coe¢ cient in the same speci…cation is always signi…cative.
The tests provide support for the …rst hypothesis. However, both best-response and …cticious play exhibit increasing …rms-price relationships before the breaking point, i.e. 2 > 0. Reinforcement learning, on the other hand, satis…es the second hypothesis. It displays a negative relationship before the breaking point and a ‡atter relationship thereafter, as predicted by the theory.
Weighted …ctitious play, power choice rules and regret models
We now check whether the poor performance of the belief-based models (BR, FP) is due to the particular speci…cations used in the available electricity models. The preceeding work in this literature motivated three simpli…cations:
First, we have used extreme behavioral assumptions about how agents form beliefs about others'
behavior. Players either disregard all periods except the last one (BR) or give equal weight to all of them (FP). We consider now an alternative weighted …ctitious play rule (WFP). Under this assumption, agents consider all their previous experience, but their opponents' earlier behavior carries less weight than more recent behavior. Second, we have assumed a linear probability choice rule, a particular type of the power probability rule proposed by Camerer and Ho (1999) . As an alternative, we also study their exponential probability rule. Third, we have not considered alternative behavioural rules based on recent additions to the literature. For example, Ert and Erev (2007) and Marchioria and Warglien (2008) include some regret-based feedback and argue that it might more accurately predict actual human behavior in games with mixed strategy equilibria.
In this section, we address the three alternative speci…cations. We use our baseline case (stepwise bidding with m = 1, and Q = 8, u = 0 with uniform initial distribution) for the WFP model ( = 1 and = 2 (0; 1)), both with linear and exponential probability rules, and with and without regret.
We use a model with an exponential regret-based choice rule, similar to Ert and Erev's (2007) model, and use their estimated parameter combinations in the benchmark speci…cation. Our implementation assumes that each action s for bin j in generator i is updated with
where j i (t) is the regret parameter. j i (t) is updated according to j i (t) = 1 +
where r j i and r j i denote again the action taken in period t by bin j of …rm i and by the rest of the bins, respectively, and j i (0) = 1. The second row provides the results of the WFP model with an exponential choice rule, as in (6), but without regret (that is, j i (t) = 1 for all t and i and j). We assume = 0:52 and, from left to right, The third row provides the results of the WFP model with an exponential choice rule, as in (6), with regret ( j i (t) updated with (7)). We use the same parameters as in the second row ( = 0:52 and, from left to right, = 2:75, = 1 and = 5). Con…dence intervals are narrower than without regret but the breaking point is less clear, especially for = 1. Post-breaking point prices also remain well above competitive levels.
Overall, it seems that one can improve on the basic belief-based algorithms of the electricity modelling literature. As an illustration, some of alternatives in this section are clearly better than the previous best-response and …ctitious play outcomes. Further tests and re…nements are necessary but this evidence indicates that one way to improve the performance of simulations models is by using experiments to identify the appropriate simulation algorithms.
Discussion and conclusions
Firms and regulators alike have started to use behavioural simulations to study the properties of many markets. However, the literature has advanced little in creating a set of standards. This paper is an attempt to advance in that direction. We study the properties of di¤erent simulation techniques and how they compare to each other and to a standard economic theory benchmark. As a case in point, The paper has several implications. First, some preceding work makes choices that are not consistent with economic theory in our simple setting. Second, future models should incorporate more systematic robustness tests. Third, we have not included all possible assumptions. For example, we have left out variable marginal costs and behavioural rules like genetic algorithms and Q-learning that are also prominent, and we have not compared the implications of di¤erent convergence de…nitions.
Fourth, our strongest result relates to …ctitious play. Its main di¤erence with best response is mainly one of memory, so that how much memory to retain and how it should decay, are intriguing, and still unresolved, algorithmic questions. We have also left out the network congestion issues inherent in the operations of electricity utilities. Finally, this paper focuses on electricity markets. We should continue doing similar exercises in other settings, as in The question of which models …t best to real data is complementary to our research and deserves future attention. The alternative belief-based models proposed in the last section of the paper perform better than best-response and …ctitious play. Empirical and especially experimental research can help in identifying the appropriate speci…cations to model electricity markets. Still, most researchers would agree in that there is no single universal set of assumptions that can be applied to all situations. This is for example one of the interpretations one can draw from Camerer and Ho's (1999) behavioural algorithm. We think that this is a valid option as long as we know the modelling choices'implications.
The ACE community has made a lot of progress in recent years and we believe it is now time to take stock of what has been achieved, consolidate and move forward. 
